If one had to write a book on political tragedy in the twentieth
century, the pages about Canada would be few and far between. I
shall not be sad when I tell my children this. However, it would
be wrong to conclude that nothing can be learned from our country's
history. One feature of the Canadian experience that can edify our
contemporaries is the relationship between federalism and Quebec.
I call this "The Great Canadian Paradox".
Since 1945, no province has tried harder than Quebec to reform
the institutions of Canadian federalism. Yet, insofar as these efforts
have often taken the shape of a drive for sovereignty, they have
probably also been the biggest obstacle to a successful transformation
of the federation. Thus, Quebec simultaneously fuels and chokes
the reform engine.
But the paradox can take a different shape.
The Canadian state and Canadian intellectuals are the champions
of federalism. Canada is the sponsor of an international organization
called the Committee for a Forum of the Federations, which will
hold a major conference next October in Mont-Tremblant, Quebec,
and former Ontario premier, Bob Rae, will play a pivotal role in
this forum. The meeting will try to develop a network of experts
and civil servants with differing perspectives on the theory and
practice of federalism.
Why should Canada play a leading role in this forum? Michael Ignatieff
gave one answer at the beginning of this decade: "Other people besides
Canadians should be concerned if Canada dies. If federalism can't
work in my Canada, it probably can't work anywhere."
Canadians champion federalism, but since the last Quebec referendum
there has been almost no sustained evaluation of the federal political
system in this country. Many people believe such an examination
would play into the hands of separatists. So what should preoccupy
us if the unity issue is ever successfully resolved? I think Canadians
should examine seriously the nature and state of their federal institutions.
The Supreme Court of Canada, in its decision last year on the
reference case concerning the secession of Quebec, identified four
principles at the heart of our political and legal systems: federalism;
democracy; constitutionalism and the rule of law; and, finally,
respect for the rights of minorities. The judgement was an ode to
the nobility and pre-eminence of federalism in Canada. However,
I think the Supreme Court neglected the content of our two most
important legal documents, the Constitution Acts of 1867 and 1982.
In 1867, the Canadian Dominion was part of the British Empire.
A hierarchical structure was created, with Westminster
above the Dominion and the provinces subordinate to Ottawa. British
politicians and civil servants were among the Fathers of Confederation,
and they made sure the imperial principle would be at least as important
as the federal one in the institutional balance of the time. Throughout
the twentieth century, Canada has gradually liberated itself from
Westminster's imperial control over our politics.
However, the same point cannot be made with regard to the relationship
between Ottawa and the provinces. Beyond the symbolism of the constitutional
monarchy, Ottawa has retained a wide array of powers over the provinces
that have more to do with imperialism than with federalism. (For
instance, the ability to legislate in all fields, to move into the
competences of the provinces, and to reserve and disallow provincial
legislation.) That they are seldom used does not render these powers
non-existent. Moreover, their mere existence creates a certain climate,
a national political habit of seeing Ottawa as the senior government
and the others as distant juniors. Beyond the customary rhetoric
concerning the number and identity of "nations" within Canada, this
imbalance is the real, lasting status quo.
If Canadians are as serious as their central government claims
about federalism, then the legal and political relationships between
Ottawa and the provinces should be rebuilt around co-ordination
rather than subordination. This point has been made eloquently by
the champions of federalism in Quebec, from the late André
Laurendeau, to such a respected figure as Claude Ryan.
As a guiding star, federalism was not as important in 1867 as
the Supreme Court has claimed. Nor was it in 1982. Most experts
recognise that the Charter of Rights has weakened the place of the
federal principle in our political culture. The first section of
the Charter establishes there are reasonable limits to the exercise
of rights in a "free and democatic society". Whenever judges have
to interpret this key part of the Charter in constitutional disputes,
they are not instructed to take into consideration the federal nature
of Canada. If federalism is our guiding star, shouldn't our Charter
proclaim to the world that we are a free and democratic federation?
So if the unity issue is ever laid to rest, modernizing institutions
to make them compatible with the spirit of federalism should occupy
centre stage in Canadian politics. This would involve, first and
foremost, a new mechanism for judiciary appointments. Supreme Court
justices should not merely be designated by the Prime Minister.
This process has nothing to do with federalism and it weakens the
legitimacy of the tribunal.
The same argument must be made with regard to the Senate. In modern
federations, such as Belgium and Germany, second legislative chambers
are effective channels of co-ordination between partners. The Canadian
federation has no permanent, day-to-day mechanism for this co-ordination.
Ronald Watts, a former Principal of Queen's University and Canada's
pre-eminent expert on federalism, has this to say about our Senate:
"Where senators are appointed by the federal government, as in Canada,
they have the least credibility as spokespersons for regional interests,
even when they are residents of the regions they represent."
All too often in Canada, reinforcing federalism means strengthening
the central government. A reformed Senate would give us a healthier
federation by enabling provincial authorities to participate in
making legislation at the centre, thereby placing additional checks
and balances in the working of our institutions.
Championing federalism in Canada will also require curtailing
the powers of the Prime Minister. Jean Chrétien has the powers
of an emperor, as we have been reminded by Donald Savoie, past president
of the Canadian Political Science Association and a Liberal insider
from New Brunswick. Around the Prime Minister, according to Professor
Savoie, "Dissent, let alone defiance, is nonexistent," and, "[C]oncentrating
so much power in the hands of one individual and a handful of courtiers
is fraught with danger."
Changing the way Supreme Court judges are nominated and redesigning
the Senate would significantly reduce the powers of the Prime Minister.
What else could be done? I think our current practice of ad hoc
federal-provincial conferences should be replaced by a Federal Council,
co-chaired by the Prime Minister and by a representative from the
group of premiers. The current process, which allows Ottawa to dictate
the agenda and control the meetings, reflects much that is wrong
with federalism in Canada.
No matter what happens to the Canadian federation in the years
to come I will, of course, teach my kids that Canada deserves its
reputation as an extraordinary country. However, I will add that
our political system does not measure up to our fame abroad. We
talk more about federalism than we practice it in our institutions.
If we can ever get beyond the impasse with Quebec, we should act
more and talk less.
A country such as Canada has a great deal to teach the world and Quebec
could make a huge contribution. More about this next time.